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NOTES
APPEAL AND ERROR DECISIONS REViEWABLE ABLE ORDERS" STATUTE OF NORTH DAKOTA. -

THE "REvIEw-

Few provisions
of the North Dakota statutes are more complicated, confusing,
antiquated and ambiguous than the sections dealing with the
appealability of judicial orders. The problem of precisely which
judicial orders are appealable has come before the North Dakota
Supreme Court approximately one hundred times.1 While a multitude of adjudications on specific points has resulted, no clearcut interpretation of the principles underlying the statutes has
emerged.

Even the name given the statute which deals with the subject
is a misnomer. The statute is generally known as the "reviewable orders" statute 2 but it does not provide for the "reviewability" of orders but rather for their "appealability."' The rule
which is law in North Dakota is that any order which may be
prejudicial, when issued in the course of a judicial proceeding,

may later be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon appeal from
the judgment. The Revised Code of 1943 provides specifically
that "upon an appeal from a judgment, the Supreme Court may
review any intermediate order or determination of the court below which involves the merits and necessarily affects the judgment appearing upon the record ....

.. 4 The reviewable orders

statute, when its function is considered, merely provides that
orders may be appealed before the entry of judgment in certain
instances;' it has nothing to do with the intrinsic power of the
Supreme Court to consider the correctness of the order. Thus,
the name of the statute is simply confusing and misleading, and
fails to indicate the Statute's true purpose.
1. Every ruling of a court or judge made or entered in writing and not included within

a judgment is an "order" in North Dakota. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2801 (1943).
2. N.D. Rev. Code §18-2702 (1943).
3. Larson v. Walker, 17 N.D. 247, 115 N.W. 838 (1908) (order denying motion to
set aside a previous order made without notice striking the cause from the calendar and
dismissing held not an appealable order).
4. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2728 (1943).
5. That an order, to be appealable, must be made so by the reviewable orders statute,
see Milde v. Leigh, 74 N.D. 15, 24 N.W.2d 55 (1946) order overruling demurrer held
non-appealable because no longer included within reviewable orders statute). Contra:
Bonde v. Stem, 72 N.D. 476, 8 N.W.2d 457 (1943) (order overruling demurrer held
appealable because appeal was brought prior to the 1943 codification). For discussion
of the rule that the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction, when the order is non-appealable,
compare Bowen v. Montana L. Ins. Co., 49 N.D. 140, 190 N.W. 314 (1922), with
Johnson v. Great Northern Ry., 12 N.D. 420, 97 N.W. 546 (1903), where the Supreme
Court expressed doubt as to the appealability of the order before it but decided the case
on the merits because the issue was not squarely presented.
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The reviewable orders statute itself provides that:
"The following orders when made by the court may be carried to the supreme court:
1. An order affecting a substantial right made in any action, when such order in effect determines the action and
prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken;
2. A final order affecting a substantial right made in special
proceedings or upon a summary application in an action after
judgment;
3. An order which grants, refuses, continues, or modifies
a provisional remedy, or grants, refuses, modifies; or dissolves
an injunction or refuses to modify or dissolve an injunction,
whether such injunction was issued in an action or special
proceeding or pursuant to the provisions of section 35-2204,
or which sets aside or dismisses a writ of attachment for irregularity;
4. An order which grants or refuses a new trial or which
sustains a demurrer;
5. An order which involves the merits of the action or
some part thereof;
6. An order for judgment on application therefor on account of the frivolousness of a demurrer, answer, or reply; or
7. An order made by the district court or judge thereof
without notice is not appealable, but an order made by the
district court after a hearing is had upon notice which vacates
or refuses to set aside an order previously made without notice may be appealed to the supreme court when by the provisions of this chapter an appeal might have been taken from
such order so made without notice, had the same been made
1
upon notice."
To understand more fully the reviewable orders statute and
to clarify the confusion which has resulted from the ambiguity
of its provisions, it is necessary to consider briefly the historical
nature of the right of appeal. It is interesting to note that the
right of appeal originally had no existence at common law in
any action triable to a jury. 7 An appeal is basically a process of
the civil law and first gained a foothold in the common law courts
through
after the common law lawyers had been familiarized with it'
its adoption in the courts of chancery.' The right of appeal, being dependent as it is upon legislative expression, exists in North
Dakota only as the statutes permit.9 The right is ordinarily gov6. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2702

(1943).

7. See Christianson v. Warehouse Association, 5 N.D. 438, 445, 67 N.W. 300,
302 (1896).
8. Ibid.
9. See Stimson v. Stimson, 30 N.D. 78, 80, 152 N.W. 132, 133 (1915); Also see
Myrick v. McCabe, 5 N.D. 422, 423, 67 N..W 143, 144 (1896) (no cause may be
reviewed by appeal unless some statute grants the right either, expressly or by necessary
implication).
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erned by the statute in existence at the time the judgment or
order from which an appeal is taken is rendered, and can be lost
by legislative repeal before it has been exercised."o It therefore
follows that only when an appeal is taken on grounds specified
by statute does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to decide
the cause. 1 Clearly in this state an appeal from a judgment regularly entered can be taken within the statutory period.1The statute quoted above is not peculiar to the law of this
state. It is a provision of the Field Code and came into the law
of North Dakota when the Field Code was adopted by the Territory of Dakota. 13 It first appeared in 1887, when it was enacted
by the legislature, and was codified into the Compiled Laws of
Dakota of 1887.14 The first statute contained five subsections which
survived without change 15 the successive compilations and revisions
of 1891,16 1899,17 and 1905.11 The 1913 compilation contained
a change in subsection 3, but retained the language of the remaining four subsections." The 1943 Revised Code altered the
form of the statute by transforming its five sections into seven,
but the only change in the substance of the statute was a deletion
of the provisions which allowed appeals from orders overruling
demurrers."o

10. See Jenson v. Frazer, 21 N.D. 267, 130 N.W. 832 (1911) (amendatory act held
not to deprive district courts of jurisdiction over perfected appeals).
11. E.g., N.D. Rev. Code §§28-2701; 28-2702 (1943; Also see Bowen v. Montana
L. Ins. Co., 49 N.D. 140, 142, 190 N.W. 314, 315 (1922); also cases cited note 5 supra.
12. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2704 (1943) (an appeal may be taken from a judgment
within six months after entry by default or after written notice of entry in cases where
the adverse party appeared).
13. For similar statutes see Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. §963 (Deering 1949); Wis.
Stats. §274.33 (1949) (it is to be noted that the Wisconsin Statute is entitled "Appealable
Orders").
14. Dak. Comp. Laws §5236 (1887).
15. Accuracy requires that it be pointed out that Comp. Laws of Dakota §5236 (2)
(1887) contained the word "for" and read as follows: ". . . or upon a summary application
in an action for judgment." This error was corrected in Garr v. Spaulding, 2 N.D. 414,
421, 51 N.W. 867, 869, (1892) wherein the court pointed out that the word "for" was
a clerical or typographical error and should be read "after" instead of "'for." (italics supplied).
16. N.D. Sess. L. (1891), C. 120, 124.
17. Rev. Codes of N.D. §5626 (1899).
18. Rev. Codes of N.D. §7225 (1905).
19. Comp. Laws of N.D. §7841 (1913) added the following to subsection 3:
or refuses to modify or dissolve an injunction, whether such injunction was issued in an
action or special proceeding or pursuant to the provisions of section 8074 (now 35-2204)
of this node."
20. Milde v. Leigh, 74 N.D. 15, 24 N.W.2d 55 (1946) (wherein the court pointed out
that the omission of orders overruling demurrers as appealable orders was intended to
eliminate unnecessary appeals which do not finally settle the controversy.) For cases under
the old statute see Bonde v. Stern, 72 N.D. 476, 8 N.W.2d 457 (1943) and Ripley v.
McCutcheon, 48 N.D. 1130, 189 N.W. 104 (1922) where an order overruling a demurrer
to one of several counterclaims was held an appealable order.

NOTES

A. ORDERs

AFFECTING "SUBSTANTIAL

RIGHTS".

A reference to subsection 1 of the reviewable orders statute
will remind the reader that the statute provides that the Supreme
Court may hear an appeal from "an order affecting a substantial
right made in any action, when such order in effect determines
the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might
be taken." 1 Subsection 2 of the statute provides for the appealability of a "final order affecting a substantial right" in "special
proceedings or upon a summary application in an action after
22
judgment."
These subsections-particularly subsection 1-have been particularly fruitful sources of litigation because of the vagueness of
the term "substantial right." Further difficulty is encountered in
determining what proceedings are considered by the court as
"actions" 23 as distinguished from "special proceedings." 24
The first appeal which arose under subsection 1 illustrates the
nature of the problem. In Persons v. Simons,2 5 it was held that
an order, to be appealable under subsection 1, had to meet three
requirements: (1) It had to affect a substantial right; (2) It
had to, in effect, determine the action; (3) It had to prevent a
judgment from which an appeal might be taken. The situation
involved in the case was that the plaintiff had sued the defendant, the case had gone to the jury, and the jury had returned a
general verdict and in addition had returned answers to certain
interrogatories submitted to it by the trial court. The defendant,
assuming that the findings of the jury were in his favor, moved
for judgment on the findings. The motion was denied. Not unnaturally assuming that he had won the case, the .plaintiff also thereupon moved for judgment. The court also denied this motion.
21. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2702 (1) (1943).
22. For one of the latest attempts to define the term "substantial right" see In re Egan's
Estate, 52 N.W.2d 820, 826 (Nebr. 1952) where the Nebraska Court stated that a
"substantial right" is an essentially legal right and not a mere technical one. Quaere:
Whether this latest effort at clarification has an opposite effect by increasing the confusion.

23. N.D. Rev. Code §32-0101

(1943)

classifies remedies as either actions or special

proceedings. Section 32-0102 defines an action as ". . . an ordinary proceeding in a
court of justice, by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection
of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense."
24. N.D. Rev. Code 532-0104 (1943) defines a special proceeding as ". . . any remedy
other than an action." That the writs mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari are by statute
designated as special proceedings see N.D. Rev. Code §32-3201 (1943); see also Gotchy

v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 49 N.D. 915, 194 N.W. 663 (1923)
(an appeal from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau is considered a
statutory proceeding rather than an action); Township of Noble v. Aasen, 10 N.D. 264,

86 N.W. 742 (1901)
as a mere

(contempt of court is not a special proceeding but is looked upon

proceeding to

vindicate the court's

authority); In

ro Eaton, 7 N.D.

269,

74 N.W. 870 (1898) (disbarment is a special proceeding).
25. 1 N.D. 243, 46 N.W. 969 (1890); ct. Boulger v. Northern P. R. Co., 41 N.D.
316, 171 N.W. 632 (1918Y.
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The plaintiff attempted to appeal from this order, citing subsection 1 of the reviewable orders statute.
The Supreme Court, although it did not attempt a definition
of a "substantial right," agreed with the plaintiff that a substantial right had been infringed by the order of the district court.
But it held that the order was not appealable because the other
conditions of the statute had not been satisfied. The order did
not in effect determine the action, nor did it prevent a judgment
from which an appeal might be taken, because it was merely
a refusal to enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor at the time the
application was made and upon the particular grounds cited by
the plaintiff. It was apparently the Supreme Court's view that
the district court could still enter judgment for either party. The
question of whether the action of the trial court was one which
involved "the merits of the action" within the meaning of subsection 5 of the reviewable orders statute was not discussed except indirectly.
The ambiguity left by the decision in the Persons case as to
just what an order "affecting a substantial right" consists of has
been perpetuated in the subsequent cases. Attempts to define
the term in subsequent decisions have all been made in the language used in the Persons case, which in reality contained no definition at all, Actually, it would appear that the term "substantial
right" is indefinable. Few concepts in the realm of law have the
elusive qualities possessed by the concept of a "right," as the
2
discussions of many authorities indicate.. 1
The court, since the decision in the Persons case, has arrived
at its results in cases involving subsection 1 of the statute by
applying the three requirements therein enunciated in inverse
order. What it has done in cases following the Persons decision
has been to inquire first whether the order prevents a judgment
from which an appeal might be taken, and whether it in effect
determines the action. If the order satisfies these two require-

26. For a famous analysis of the concept of "rights" see Beale, Conflict of Laws
64-86 (1935; see also Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913). When the word "substantial" is applied as a qualifying
adjective to the word "right," the elusive quality of the concept is substantially increased.
A person has a legal right, pragmatically speaking, if the courts will impose upon some
other person the duty of respecting that right. If a court will not grant protection to a claim
of right, the result is simply an adjudication that there is no right to be protected. It is a
famous maxim that "A right without a remedy is no right at all." Thus, the idea of an
"insubstantial right" is a contradiction in terms. Any right that the courts will protect
is a "substantial" right; any "insubstantial" right, which the courts will not recognize,
is not a right at all. See also 19 Notre Dame Law. 384 (1944).

NOTES

ments, it has been the position of the court that it also infringes
a "substantial right" and is therefore appealable.27
An additional difficulty is encountered in the attempt to determine whether an order "determines the action." 28 For this
reason an order of the trial court ordering the bringing in of an
additional defendant at the request of the defendant, while appealable under subsection 5 of the statute as "involving the merits"
was expressly held non-appealable under subsection 1 because of
a failure to satisfy requirements (2) and (3) of the rule of the
Persons case."'
Another illustration of a case where there was a failure to satisfy requirements (2) and (3) of the Persons rule is West Branch
Pants Co. v. Gordon. 3° The defendant in that case had been ordered to appear before the judge for examination by the adverse
party prior to trial. The defendant appealed from a denial of
his motion to vacate the order. The court dismissed the appeal
on the grounds that the order did not fall within any of the subdivisions of the reviewable orders statute. In referring to the
order's failure to qualify under subsection 1, the court stated 31
that the order did not determine the action or prevent the rendition of a judgment from which an appeal could be taken. 32 The
order was held to be merely a proceeding within and incidental
to the main action. Nor did it involve the merits, within the
meaning of subsection 5 of the statute.
In re Weber, 3 an early case, refused to allow an appeal under
subsection I from an order dismissing an appeal from justice
court for jurisdictional reasons. The majority of the court took
the view that such an order of dismissal did not operate as a
judgment, but that the order was merely authority for the entry
of the judgment. The majority, furthermore, took the position
27. In Bowen v. Montana L. Ins. Co., 49 N.D. 140, 190 N.W. 314 (1922) the
court was faced with the question of whether the denial of a motion for a directed verdict
and for judgment notwithstandiing the disagreement of the jury was an appealable order.
Following the precedent laid down in Persons v. Simons the court dismissed the appeal
but not before saying that the order did not come within subsection 1 because it did not
determine the action. See also Whitney v. Ritz, 24 N.D. 576, 140 N.W. 676 (1913)
(where order held non-appealable because it did not prevent a judgment from which an
appeal might have been taken). But see Bolton v. Donavan, 9 N.D. 575, 577, 84 N.W.
357, 358 (1900) where the court held the order affected a substantial right without
satisfying conditions (2) and (3).
28. See note 24 supra for illustrations of proceedings which are not actions.
29. Bolton v. Donavan, 9 N.D. 575, 577, 84 N.W. 357, 358 (1900).
30. 51 N.D. 742, 200 N.W. 908 (1924).
31. Id. at 744, 200 N.W. at 909.
32. For the same reason an appeal from an order overruling an objection to the
jurisdiction of the court as setting aside a special appearance is not an appealable order.
See McKivergin v. Atwood, 63 N.D. 73, 246 N.W. 41 (1932).
33. 4 N.D. 119, 59 N.W. 523 (1894).
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that a judgment was necessary to accomplish a dismissal of the:
appeal from justice court. A dissenting judge argued vigorously
that because an attempted appeal which does not confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court is properly dismissed by motion
that the order of dismissal took on such a cloak of finality that it
34
became an appealable order.
The difficulties which have been encountered in attempting to
define a "substantial right" under subsection 1 have also been
met with reference to subsection 2. Subsection 2 makes appealable final orders affecting a substantial right made in either special
proceedings or in actions where a summary application has been
made after the rendition of a judgment.
It has long been considered a settled rule in this state that an
appeal will not lie from an order granting a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, where the motion was seasonably
made.3 5 In Olson v. Ottertail Power Co.,36 the defendant, at the
close of the plaintiff's case in an action for negligence, moved
for a direeted verdict, and renewed the motion at the close of
the entire case. After the verdict had been returned for the plaintiff the defendant moved for a stay of execution so that he could
prepare a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. By
its order the trial court stayed all proceedings except the entry
of judgment and thereafter ordered the entry of judgment on the
verdict. The defendant's motion for judgment non obstante verdicto then came on for hearing and was granted. Plaintiff took
an appeal from the order granting the motion. The Supreme Court
had little difficulty finding that the order was a final one affecting a substantial right made upon summary application in an
action after judgment, and consequently appealable.3 7 It had
been previously held in this state that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict has the effect of reviewing only the
court's rulings in denying a motion for directed verdict.3t It
34. Id. at 131, 59 N.W. 527 (dissenting opinion).
35. Turner v. Crumpton, 25 N.D. 134, 141 N.W. 209 (1913) (the denial of a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not an appealable order where it is not
accompanied to the Supreme Court with a denial of a motion for a new trial).

36. 65 N.D. 46, 256 N.W. 246 (1934).
37. The

court

upheld

plaintiff's

contention

that

the

order

was

more than

a

mere

order for judgment in that it set aside a previously entered judgment thereby assuming
the character of an order affecting a substantial right.

38. Ennis v. Retail Merchants Asso. M. F. Ins. Co., 33 N.D. 20, 156 N.W. 234 (1916)
the court pointed out that two pre-requisites are essential to justify a trial court to order
judgment notwithstanding the verdict: (1) denial of a motion for a directed verdict and
(2) the party who moved for the directed verdict must have been entitled to a directed
verdict at the time of the motion). For the latest legislative change see N.D. Sess.
Laws, c. 204 (1951).
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would appear from the court's opinion in the Ottertail Power case
that the better procedure would have been for the defendant
to have moved for a new trial on the ground that the trial court
had committed error in denying the motion for a directed verdict. 9
The "special proceedings" referred to in subsection 2 are remedies of statutory origin,"0 and include any remedy not considered as an action,4 1 e.g. proceedings in mandamus, certiorari,
habeas corpus and the like. It has been held that pre-trial conferences are not special proceedings but are merely incidental
to a remedy and serve merely to narrow issues, settle pleadings,
and limit the number of witnesses.4 2 Similarly, contempt proceedings, being of a criminal character with the objective of vindicating the court's authority, are not considered special proceedings. 43 It is apparently necessary for contempt proceedings
to be remedial in character in order to qualify them as special
proceedings. 44 An analogous situation was presented in the case
of Merchant v. Pielke.45 The plaintiff had secured a decree reforming a contract between himself and defendant, and included
within the decree was a restraining order to protect the plaintiff's person and insure compliance with the decree. The plaintiff
later secured an order for the defendant to show cause why he
should not be adjudged in contempt for having violated the injunction. The defendant set up as a defense that he had appealed
from the decree and filed a supersedeas bond. The question was
whether the filing of the supersedeas bond had the effect of dissolving the injunctional portion of the decree. The trial court
ruled that the filing of the bond dissolved the injunctional portion of the decree, and dismissed the order to show cause on
the ground the defendant could not be held in contempt. The
Supreme Court held this order appealable under subsection 2
as a final order affecting a substantial right made in a special
proceeding. The contempt proceeding was treated as being a
special proceeding because it was remedial in character and not
of a criminal nature.
39. 65 N.D. 46, 53, 256 N.W. 246, 249 (1934).
40. See Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 521, 144 N.W. 1082, 1084 (1914).
41. N.D. Rev. Code §32-0104 (1943).
42. LaPlante v. Implement Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co., 73 N.D. 159, 12 N.W.2d
630 (1944).
43. North Dakota ex rel. Edwards v. Davis, 2 N.D. 461, 51 N.W. 942 (1892).
44. Id. at 468, 51 N.W. tit 944 where the court intimates that should the contempt
proceedings be brought to idemnify the injured antagonist that such a proceeding would
be in the nature of a remedy and in an appropriate proceeding could be considered as a
"special proceeding."
45. 9 N.D. 245, 83 N.W. 18 (1900).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

In the score or more cases
light penetrates to partially
substantial right" as used in
"affecting a substantial right

appealed under subsection 2 some
illuminate the phrase "affecting a
the statute. Illustrative of orders
upon summary application in an
v. Crabtree " and Mielare
Rabinowitz
after
judgment"
action
carek v. Riske. 1 In the Rabinowitz case the defendant, through
inadvertence, had failed to include on appeal an official transcript
of the record. Assuming that no appeal was being taken the
plaintiff issued execution. The defendant thereupon immediately
made application for additional time within which to prepare
a statement and to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This motion was denied after a hearing and the defendant
appealed from the order denying his motion. The order was
held appealable under subsection 2 because it ended the defendant's remedies in the trial court. In Mielcarek v. Riske the court
held that an order denying a motion to vacate an irregularly
entered judgment appealable and substituted therefor a judg4
ment in conformity with the verdict. 1
B.

ORDERS AFFECTING PROVISIONAL

REMEDIES

Subsection 3 of the renewable orders statute concerns itself
principally with orders affecting provisional remedies. 9 Unlike
the preceding sections the instant subsection is sufficiently definite to accurately guide the practitioner in determining the appealability or non-appealability of an order in so far as it relates
to provisional remedies. The clarity of the language used by
the legislature in subsection 3 largely accounts for the dearth
of adjudicated cases construing its terminology. However, in
Swiggum v. Valley Invest. Co., 0 the court was called upon to
construe the term "modifies" as applied to provisional remedies.
The court held that an order which fixed the amount of the
46. 27 N.D. 353, 145 N.W. 1055 (1914); see also St. P., M. & M. Ry. Co.
v. Blakemore, 17 N.D. 67, 114 N.W. 730 (1908) (proper remedy from an order
directing the clerk to retain money paid in satisfaction of a judgment until a determination
could be made of thte taxes due was by appeal from the order rather than by writ of

certiorari).
47. 74 N.D. 202, 21 N.W.2d 218 (1945).
48. That this is the proper procedure, see Olson v. Mattison and Storby, 16 N.D.
231, 112 N.W. 994 (1907). A motion to vacate a judgment which appeals to the
discretion of the court and which raises questions in addition to errors of law prior to
judgment, is an appealable order as soon as the trial court enters an order denying the
motion to vacate; see Boyd v. Lermmon, 49 N.D. 64, 189 N.W. 681 (1922).
49. N.D. Rev. Code §32-0110 (1943): "The provisional remedies in civil actions are:.
(1) Claim and delivery of personal property; (2) Attachment; (3) Garnishment; (4)
Receivers; and (5) Deposits in court." See Forman v. Healy; 11 N.D. 563, 566,
93 N.W. 866, (1903) (where the court also includes injunctions as a provisional remedy;.
but one available only to a plaintiff in a civil action upon a proper showing).
' 50. 73 N.D. 396, 15 N.W.2d 467 (1944).

NOTES

bond in a garnishment at less than double the amount demanded
in the complaint was an order which modified the provisional
remedy of garnishment and therefor an appealable order under
subsection 3.5"
In State v. Vick,5 2- a controversy involving the legal residence
of a family carried upon the relief rolls of Burke County, a justice of the peace, upon the complaint of the overseer of the poor
of Burke County, ordered an order for the removal of the Vick
family to Barnes County. The Barnes County authorities caused
an appeal to be taken from this order and for an order to stay
the enforcement of the order pending the appeal. The plaintiff
thereupon moved for dismissal of the appeal and for an order
vacating the order staying the enforcement of the order. Both
motions being denied, the plaintiff appealed upon the theory
that the order was appealable under subsection 3 as being a
refusal to dissolve an injunction. The Supreme Court held that
the order was not appealable under any subsection of the reviewable orders statute and that although the order stayed the
removal of the Vick family to Barnes County this did not operate to render the order an injunction. The order operated simply
to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the final determination upon appeal.
C.

ORDERS

GRANTING

OR

REFUSING

NEW

TRIALS

OR

SUSTAINING

DEMURIRERS

Orders which grant or refuse new trials or sustain demurrers
are appealable under subsection 4 of the statute. This subsection was formerly the last appendage to subsection 3 and included, prior to the 1943 codification, orders which overruled
demurrers as well.-3 The 1943 Revised Code omitted the rule
that an order overruling a demurrer was appealable, in an effort
to eliminate unnecessary appeals which did not finally determine
54
the controversy.
Most of the litigation which has centered about this subsection
51. In the second appeal of this case, 73 N.D. 422, 15 N.W.2d 862 (1944) the
court held non-appealable an order denying a motion to consolidate two actions for
trial. The order is an illustration of an interlocutory order clearly not appealable except
by special statutory dispensation.
52. 62 N.D. 654, 244 N.W. 873 (1932).
53. Comp. Laws of N.D. §7841 (1913). For cases under the statute prior to the
change see Bonde v. Stern, 72 N.D..476, 8 N.W.2d 457 (1943) (order overruling a
demurrer to complaint held appealable); Ripley v. McCutcheon, 48 N.D. 1130, 189
N.W. 104 (1922) (an order overruling a demurrer to one of several counterclaims was
held to be an appealable order).
54. See Milde v. Leigh, 74 N.D. 15, 24 N.W.2d 55, 56 (1946) (omission made
upon recommendation of the committee on procedure).
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has arisen from the practice of making motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial.
In Turner v. Crumpton, 5 a 1913 decision, an appeal was taken
from an order denying a motion for judgment n.o.v before entry
of the judgment. The court held that an order denying a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not in and of itself
an appealable order, when it is not coupled with some other
motion, such as a motion for a new trial, which will give the
court jurisdiction. Apparently in response to the holding of this
decision, the practice was followed in several later cases of making
alternative motions for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial. The
"catch" to this line of procedure appeared in Stratton v. Rosen5 6
in which the court granted the new trial but denied the
quist,
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The movant
thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court from the order granting a new trial on the theory that the order was one expressly
made appealable by statute. The court held, however, that since
the appellant had himself asked for the new trial, he was in no
position to claim injury at having received the relief he had asked
for. This being so, the court would not consider the merits of
the decision denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. "If a party does not want a new trial," the court
said, "he ought not to ask for it." 57 The correct procedure under
this decision would appear to have been to make the motion
file a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and then 58
for new trial if the motion for judgment was denied.
The rule of Stratton v. Rosenquist did not survive for long.
Four years after its decision the legislature enacted a statute
providing that where a motion for a new trial and a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict were coupled in the alternative, the Supreme Court might review the order denying the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict even though
the motion for new trial had been granted. 59 In Welch Mfg. Co.
0
the issue arose again. The court
v. Herbst Department Store,"
55. 25 N.D. 134, 141 N.W. 209 (1913).
56. 37 N.D. 116, 163 N.W. 723 (1917); accord, Strong v. Nelson, 43, N.D. 326,
174 N.W. 869 (1919).
57. 37 N.D. 116, 121, 163 N.W. 723, 724. That the Supreme Court of Wisconsin used
the. same line of reasoning see Larson v. Hanson, 207 Wis. 485, 242 N.W. 184, 185 (1932).
58. ibid. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in effect, reviews only
the courts' ruling in denying a motion for a directed verdict. See Ennis v. Retail Merchants
Asso. M. F. Ins. Co., 33 N.D. 20, 36, 156 N.W. 234, 238 (1916).
59. C. 133, N.D. Sess. Laws (1921); now N.D. Rev. Code §28-1511 (1943) as
amended by C. 204, N.D. Sess. Laws (1951).
60. 53 N.D. 42, 204 N.W. 849 (1925).
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stated that it was "satisfied" with the rule of Stratton v. Rosenquist
but bowed to the obvious intention of the legislature and reviewed the decision of the trial court on both matters. The 1951
session of the legislature re-enacted the rule that both orders
were reviewable on appeal, but strengthened it by providing
that the court "shall" review both orders.' The previous section
had stated that the court "may" review them. 2
One additional point concerning the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict should be noted. The reader will
recall that in the case of Turner v. Crumpton, supra., the court
held that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was
not appealable when made before the entry of judgment. But
after the judgment has been entered, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appealable as a "final order affecting
a substantial right .. .upon a summary application in an action
after judgment" as well as being an order which "involves the
merits of the action." 03
D. ORDERS WHICH INVOLVE "THE MIERITS OF THE ACTION"
Certainly the most broadly phrased subsection of the reviewable orders statute is the clause which provides than an appeal
may be taken from "an order which involves the merits of the
action or some part thereof." Because of its broadness the language of the section is not intrinsically helpful.
It is however clear from the decisions of the court that an order which "involves the merits" is not the same as one which
affects a "substantial right.64 The requirements set out by the
court in Persons v. Simons, supra, with respect to orders "affecting a substantial right" are not applicable to orders which involve
the "merits of the action." 65 But simply to state that an order
which affects a substantial right is different from one which "involves the merits" defines neither term, does not aid analysis, and
solves nothing.
An examination of the early cases, however, will indicate the
gUiding principle underlying the definition of orders involving
the merits of an action. Probably the earliest and certainly one
61. C. 204, J2, N.D. Sess. Laws (1951).
62. N.D. Rev. Code §28-1511 (1943).
63. Olson v. Ottertail Power Co., 65 N.D. 46, 256 N.W. 246 (1934).
64. See Schutt v. Federal Land Bank, 71 N.D. 640, 642, 3 N.W.2d 417 (1942);
Hauser v. Security Credit Co., 66 N.D. 399, 406, 266 N.W. 104, 107 (1936) (where the
court pointed out that the phrase "involves the merits" has been construed to embrace
orders which pass upon the substantial legal rights of the complainant whether such rights
do or do not relate directly to the subject matter in controversy or to the cause of action).
65. See cases cited note 64 supra.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

of the most illuminating discussions is found in the case of St. John
v. West,6 6 in a decision written by Mr. Justice Selden of New
York in 1850. The court had before it an action of ejectment.
The plaintiffs proposed to add the names of several additional
persons as parties plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion,
and the plaintiff appealed. The question before the court was
whether the order involved the merits of the case and could
thus be taken up on appeal. To settle this question, it was necessary for Justice Selden to define the term "involves the merits."
Justice Selden had this to say:
"To make the provision in question . . . accord at all with
those notions which long experience and the practice of
courts have heretofore settled as just and proper, it is obvious that some signification must be given to one or the
other of the terms referred to, more or less variant from its
most common and natural import. The word 'merits', as a legal term, having acquired no precise technical meaning, clearly
admits of some latitude of interpretation. Let it be understood, therefore, in the section of the statute under review,
as meaning the strict legal rights of the parties, as contradistinguished from those mere questions of practice which
every court regulates for itself, and from all matters which
depend upon the discretion or favor of the court, and we
have not only a rational but an exact and well defined construction of the provision in question. It would then give
an appeal from every order which involved, that is, passed
upon and determined, any positive legal right of either party,
and deny it in all other cases." 67
This is apparently the construction of the statute which is law
in North Dakota. In the first place, the decision in St. John v.
West, supra, was handed down prior to the adoption of the statute in this state, and the construction placed upon it may therefore be regarded as having been incorporated into it by implication
'
when the legislature passed the statute. Secondly, although ihe
court refused, in Ellingson v. Northwestern Jobbers Credit Bureau, 9 to adopt this construction when it was quoted to it from
a Minnesota decision which mirrors almost to the word the analysis of Justice Selden, 0 other cases have apparently done so."
66. 4 How. Pr. R. 329 (N.Y. 18.50).
67. Id. at 332.
68. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction §5209 (3rd ed. 1943).
69. 58 N.D. 754, 758, 227 N.W. 360 (1929).
70. See Piano Mfg. Co. v. Kaufert, 86 Minn. 13, 15, 89 N.W. 1124, 1125 (1902).
71. See Hauser v. Security Credit Co., 66 N.D. 399, 406, 266 N.W. 104, 107 (1936)
and cases therein cited to the effect that an order "involving the merits" within the meaning
of the statute must decide some question involving some strictly legal right as distinguished
from a mere question of practice.
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In short, the statute impliedly contains a distinction between
those orders which affect a substantive right of the parties to an
action, and those orders which affect a right which is merely
procedural in character. That this is true becomes apparent upon
a consideration of the North Dakota precedents.
Thus, for example, the North Dakota court has held non-appealable as not involving the "merits of the action" orders which deny a trial at law by jury,72- orders overruling an objection to the
court's jurisdiction and an attempted special appearance,"5 denying a motion to strike an amended complaint from the files
and for judgment on the pleadings,'7 refusing to vacate a restraining order pending an appeal,7i denying a motion to strike
portions of a counterclaim,71 remanding a case from the district
to the county court for the purpose of admitting new evidence,7"
denying a motion to dismiss, 78 denying a motion to vacate an order advancing a cause on the calendar,'7 denying a motion for
continuance, 10 requiring the defendant to appear for a pre-trial
examination, 8 to show cause why a divorce decree should not
be vacated and denying a motion to quash,82 requiring a pleader
to make his pleadings more definite and certain, 3 denying a
motion to consolidate two actions for trial,"4 granting a motion
to amend a complaint," and refusing to dismiss an appeal from
a county court.88
72. Schutt v. Federal Land Bank, 71 N.D. 640, 3 N.W.2d 417 (1942); Gulbro v.
Roberts, 43 N.D. 455, 171 N.W. 616 (1919) (order denying a jury trial until after the
issues of the counterclaim had been tried to the court held not appealable).
73. McKivergin v. Atwood, 63 N.D. 73, 246 N.W. 41 (1932); Bennett v. Bennett.
54 N.D. 86, 208 N.W. 846 (1926).
74. Torgerson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co., 51 N.D. 745, 200 N.W.
1013 (1924).
75. State ex rel. Lemke v. District Court, 49 N.D. 27, 186 N.W. 381 (1921).
76. Ferguson v. Jenson, 76 N.D. 647, 38 N.W.2d 560 (1949).
77. Re Glavkee, 75 N.D. 118, 25 N.W.2d 925 (1947).
78. Union Brokerage Co. v. Jenson, 74 N.D. 154, 20 N.W.2d 343 (1945); Burdick
v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545 (1930)
(appeal taken from several orders
including the denial of a motion to dismiss); Security Nat. Bank v. Bothne, 56 N.D.
269, 217 N.W. 148 (1927)
(order denying motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction);
Strecker v. Railson, 19 N.D. 677, 125 N.W. 560 (1910) (order denying defendant's motion
for dismissal and granting plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint both held nonappealable).
79. Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545 (1930).
80. Ibid.
81. West Branch Pants Co. v. Gordon, supra note 30.
82. Schillerstrom v. Sehillerstrom, 74 N.D. 761, 24 N.W.2d 734 (1946).
83. First Nat. Bank v. Farm Mortg. Loan & T. Co., 56 N.D. 7, 215 N.W. 877 (1927);
Sec Johnson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 12 N.D. 420, 422, 97 N.W. 546, (1903)
(wherein the court decided the appeal on its merits but intimated by way of dictum
that should the case come squirely before it they would hold the order non-appealable).
84. Swiggum v. Valley Invest. Co., 73 N.D. 422, 15 N.W.2d 862 (1944)
(second
appeal).
85. Strecker v. Railson, 19 N.D. 677, 125 N.W. 560 (1910).
86. In re Bratcher, 74 N.D. 12, 24 N.W.2d 54 (1946).
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Consideration of these precedents will reveal, it is believed,
that the common thread tying them together is the fact that all
appear to have involved questions which were basically procedural in character. A few of the decisions illustrate the point
that the distinction between orders affecting a procedural right
and those affecting a substantive right is principally one of degree, and difficult to make in close cases. For example, the familiar rule that one cannot appeal from an order for judgment
but only from the entry of the judgment itself1 7 presents a
rather close issue under the subsection in question. Certainly a
strong argument could be made for the proposition that an order for judgment is an order which in effect determines the action.
It is the last formal order which the trial judge himself makes.
Thus, there would be a certain amount of logic to the position
that the order is one which involves the merits of the action, a
point borne out by the fact that an order for judgment is considered appealable when it is made in a special proceeding.s 8
The rule that one cannot appeal from an order for judgment
simply reflects the court's judgment that the order is basically a
procedural step. Of course, if one wants to appeal before the
entry of judgment, one can make a motion for a new trial, and
appeal from the decision on that. 9
Another illustration of a case presenting a close question as
to whether the order affected a substantive or procedural right
is Ellingson v. Northwestern Jobbers Credit Bureau.0 In that
case the court held non-appealable an order denying a motion
to vacate the service of summons on a foreign corporation, where
the motion was made on the ground that the person on whom
service of process was made was not an agent of the foreign
corporation, and therefore service of process had not been made
in the state of North Dakota. If the decision denying the motion
is considered as an adjudication that the defendant corporation
87. See e.g., In re Eaton, 7 N.D. 269, 273, 74 N.W. 870, 871 (1898)
(an order
for judgment is non-appealable but is reviewable on appeal from the judgment).
88. Oliver v. Wilson, 8 N.D. 590, 80 N.W. 757 (1899)
(order granting writ of
mandamus).
89. Orders granting or denying new trials are appealable under the express provisions
of the statute. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2702 (4)
(1943).
The practice appears to be to
join a motion for a new trial in the alternative with a motion for judgment n.o.v. So far
as the motion for judgment n.o.v. is concerned, the making of a motion for directed verdict
prior to the submission of the case to the jury is a condition precedent, which, if not
met, results in loss of the right to make the motion. See, e.g. Lueck v. State, 70 N.D.
604, 605, 296 N.W. 917 (1941); Gross v. Miller, 51 N.D. 755, 200 N.W. 101,1
(1924)
(motion for directed verdict is a necessary preliminary to motion for judgment
n.o.v.).

90. 58 N.D. 754, 227 N.W. 360 (1929)
N.D. 269, 217 N.W. 148 (1927).

ofirming Security Nat. Bank v. Bothne, 56
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was present within the state of North Dakota, there is some room
for argument that the order affected a substantive right. But
the logical answer would appear to be that requiring a person
to participate in a legal proceeding has never been held to be,
in and of itself, an infringement of any substantive right.
Orders which do involve the merits of an action, and which
are therefore appealable, have been held to include orders vacating findings of fact and relieving the parties from the effects
of certain stipulations," orders setting aside stipulations for dismissal of the action"' aid orders modifying a dismissal with
prejudice. ' A survey of the cases indicates that the court has
decided more cases in favor of non-appealability than it has in
favor of appealability under this statute. That this should be
true is not surprising. There are sound reasons of good judgment
indicating that the court should go slow in allowing appeals
from an action prior to the determination of all, instead of merely one or two, of the issues involved in it. In Whitney v. Ritz 9'
an action was brought in justice court for damages for the burning of grass on the plaintiff's land. The defendant moved to
reverse and set aside the judgment for the plaintiff in the justice
court on the appeal to the district court, contending that the
pleadings below had been oral in violation of statute and that
consequently the justice court was without jurisdiction to hear
the action for injury to the freehold. The court held that the
defendant could not appeal from the denial of the order, and
that he should have waited for the entry of a judgment in the
district court. The court stated, in the course of its opinion, that:
"The purpose and wisdom of this provision are apparent. It
prevents multiplicity of appeals in the same action, and enables the party to secure a determination upon questions
arising in the progress of litigation, prior to final judgment,
on an appeal from the judgment. Otherwise all proceedings
in an action might be stayed pending the determination of
separate appeals from each order made during the life of
the case, and a final judgment thereby prevented or postponed for years."'
One further word may be added concerning the "involving
the merits" section of the statute. It would appear that from time
to time the court has held orders appealable which did not in91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Barlow, 20 N.D. 197, 126 N.W. 23.3 (1910).
Lilly v. Haynes Co-op!Coal Mining Co., 48 N.D. 9;37, 188 N.W. 38 (1922).
Hauser v. Security Credit Co., 66 N.D. .399, 266 N.W. 104 (19.36).
24 N.D. 576, 140 N.W. 676 (1913).
Id. at 579, 140N.W. 677.
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fringe substantive rights, on the basis of the "involving the merits"
section. For instance, it has been held that an order bringing
in an additional party defendant at the request of the defendant
was appealable as being one which involved the merits of the
action." It has similarly been held that an order directing the
clerk of court to retain money paid to a litigant in satisfaction
of a judgment in a condemnation proceeding brought by a railroad until the hearing of a claim by a county against the litigant
for unpaid taxes involved the merits and was appealable, 9 7 as
is an order granting or denying a change of venue. 98
The authority on this point, however, is scanty anddiscussion
of reasons for the holding is generally lacking. There appears
to be no good reason why an order bringing in an additional
defendant should be held to involve the merits of the action and
to give an immediate right of appeal. The code provides that
"parties may be dropped or added by 'order of the court on
motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of "-he
action and on such terms as are just," " thus indicating that the
addition or dropping of parties is considered a relatively routine
operation. It is difficult to see why such a step should carry with
it the consequence of a suspension of the entire proceedings while
the slow process of an appeal is being consummated.
With respect to an order granting or denying a change of
venue the situation is a little different. A change of venue is generally requested on the grounds that a fair trial cannot be had
in the district where suit is brought. This is a matter with
which the Supreme Court is concerned by virtue of the duty
incumbent upon it, under its general power to supervise proceedings in lower courts, to see to it that proceedings in the district courts are conducted justly and fairly. In the exercise of
this superintending jurisdiction, for instance, the court has gone
so far as to review orders concerning change of venue in criminal cases, where an appeal on the part of the state is impossible,
by means of the writ of certiorari. 100 But while the rule that a
96. Bolton v. Donavan, 9 N.D. 575, 84 N.W. 357 (1900).
97. St. P., M. & M. fy. Co. v. Blakemore 17 N.D. 67, 114 N.W. 730 (1908).
98. Robertson Lumber Co. v. Jones, 13 N.D. 112, 99 N.W. 1082 (1904) (order
granting a change of venue in a civil action held appealable); White v. Chicago, M. &
St. P. R. Co., 5 Dak. 508, 41 N.W. 730 (1889). (order denying a change of venue).
99. N.D. Rev. Code §28-0211 (1943).
100. State v. Winchester, 19 N.D. 756, 122 N.W. 1111 (1909); accord, State ex tel.
Fletcher v. District Court, 213 Iowa 822, 238 N.W. 290 (1931.). For a discussion of
the superintending jurisdiction of the North Dakota Supreme Court see Crum, The Writ
of CertiorariIn North Dakota, 27 N.Dak.L.Rev. 271 (1951).
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change of venue is appealable on direct appeal from the order
possesses some justification, it is submitted that there is none for
a rule which permits an appeal on a question which is both
basically procedural and which does not carry with it the danger
of an unfair trial. In cases involving other than a change of venue
it is believed that an order should be appealable as involving
the merits only when it affects a substantive right.
E. SUBSECTION 6 OF THE STATUTE
Subsection 6 of the reviewable orders statute provides that
an order for judgment on application therefor on account of "the
frivolousness of a demurrer, answer, or reply is appealable. The
inclusion of subsection 6 within the present "reviewable orders"
statute raises two questions: (1) Why should it exist at all?
(2) Since it does exist, should the rule that one cannot appeal
from an order for judgment in other situations be abolished?
With respect to question (1), no satisfactory answer is to be
found. An order for judgment is not appealable in any other
situation, 101 and there appears to be no sound reason for making
an exception in this particular case. Possibly the exception exists
to permit an unsuccessful litigant to vent his injured pride by
immediately taking the case before a higher tribunal, but no other
justification for it comes to mind or is to be found in the cases.
It is submitted that the provision should be repealed.
So far as question (2) is concerned, a slightly more important
problem is involved. The rule that one cannot appeal from an
order for judgment, but rather only from the entrance of tie
judgment itself, would appear open to at least some criticism
on the ground that it simply presents a trap for the unwary. 02
If it is permissible to appeal from an order for judgment in "the
specific case where an order for judgment is entered on account
of the frivolousness of an adversary's pleading, why then is it
not permissible to do so in all cases? The fact that this means
an appeal may be taken before the judgment itself is entered
is really beside the point; as has been demonstrated earlier, if
one wishes to appeal before the entry of judgment, he may move
for a new trial and appeal from the order denying it.
The only reason which might be suggested for denying per101. Except of course in a special proceeding.
102. The N.D. Rev. Code §28-0901 (1943)
provides that "A judgment is the final
determination of the rights of the parties in an action."
Also see Universal Motors v.
Conan, 73 N.D. 337, 338, 15 N.W.2d 73, (1944) wherein the court states that strictly
speaking in North Dakota there are no judgnents other than final judgments.
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mission to appeal from an order for judgment is that it is possible that the appeal will be taken before the grounds have been
specifically presented to the lower court, e.g. by motion for a
new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. But the
code provides now that "no motion for a new trial shall be necessary to obtain, on appeal, a review of any questions of law or of
the sufficiency of the evidence unless before the taking of the
appeal the judge shall notify counsel of the party intending to
1
take the appeal that he desires such motion to be made."
This would seem to indicate that even in the case of the appeal
from a judgment, no clear-cut specifications of the issues to be
raised on appeal need be presented to the lower court before,hand. Logically there is no reason why the same policy should
not be followed if an order for judgment is made appealable.
F. SUBSECTION 7 OF THE STATUTE
Subsection 7 of the statute specifically provides that orders
made by the court without notice are not appealable."' But an
order made by the court, after hearing has been had upon notice,
which vacates or refuses to set aside a previously entered order
made without notice may be appealed if the previously entered
order would have been appealable if it had been made after
notice. This subsection requires that the district court be given
an opportunity, upon a noticed hearing, to reconsider orders
which it has made without notice as a condition precedent to
an appeal.15 Subsection 7 of the present reviewable orders statute formerly was subsection 5.106 The original subsection provided that an appeal would lie from "orders made by the district
court, vacating or refusing to set aside orders made at chambers
where . . . an appeal might have been taken, in case the order
so made at chambers had been granted or denied by the district
court in the first instance. ... 107 The language of this subsection
was modified in the RevisedCodes of 1899 and has since remained
in its present form except for an immaterial change in tense in
"s
the 1943 codification.
The question of whether an order was one made by the court
103. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2727 (194:3).
104. Universal Motors v. Coman, 73 N.D. 337, 15 N.W.2d 73 (1944).
105. Id. at 338, 15 N.V.'.2d 73.
106. E.g., N.D. Comp. Laws §7841 (5) (1913); N.D. Rev. Codes §7225 (5)
(1905);
N.D. Rev. Codes §5626 (5) (1899).
107. N.D. Comp. Laws §5236 (1887); C. 120, §24 N.D. Sess. Laws (1891).
108. Where formerly the statute read ". . . are not appealable," the 1943 codification
of the N.D. Rev. Code §28-2702 (7) (1943) now reads "'.. . is not appealable."
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or merely a "chambers" order was involved in the case of Insurance Co. v. Weber. "" The action was one for unlawful detainer and originated in justice court. A judgment for the plaintiff was entered and the defendant appealed on both questions
of fact and law and demanded a trial de novo in the district
court. The plaintiff obtained an order requiring the defendant
to appear before the district judge at "chambers" and show cause
why the action was appealable. A hearing was then held and
an order made that the appeal be dismissed. The order was
signed with the judge's name, followed by the words: "Judge
District Court, Richland County, N.D." After the time for appeal from this order had expired, the defendant moved that the
district court vacate the order. This motion was denied, after
hearing, and the order denying the motion was signed: "By the
Court: W. S. Lauder, Judge District Court, Richland County,
N.D." The defendant appealed from this order, arguing that
the first order dismissing the appeal from justice court was a
mere "chambers" order because the words "By the court" did not
precede the judge's signature. The Supreme Court held the omission of the quoted words immaterial, and said that the appeal
from the order denying the motion to vacate the first order
failed because it was basically an attempt to extend the statutory period of appeal from the first order.
In the later case of Larson v. Walker,11 an appeal was taken
from an order striking the cause from the calendar and for the
dismissal of the action instead of from the judgment of dismissal. The appellant contended, when he awoke to his error, that
the order was appealable because the order was one which
denied a motion to set aside a previous order made without notice.111 The response from the court was that since the original
order made without notice was non-appealable, no right of appeal accrued when the court thereafter on a hearing refused to
set aside the original order. This was because whether such an
order was made with or without notice, it was non-appealable.
G.

SUMMARY AND

PROPOSAL

Many problems must be faced by the practitioner before the
question of what orders are appealable can be satisfactorily
109. 2 N.D. 239, 50 N.W. 703 (1891).
110. 17 N.D. 247, 115 N.W. 838 (1908); For another case construing this subsection
see Olson v. Mattison and Storby, 16 N.D. 231, 112 N.W. 994 (1907).
111. This again illustrates the technicality of the rule that one cannot appeal from
an order for judgment.
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solved. From the very nature of the present reviewable orders
statute and the cases construing its subsections it is clear that
judicial interpretations have not wholly dispelled the ambiguity
and confusion which surround such terms as "affecting a substantial right" and "involves the merits of the action." The suggestion that the ambiguity and confusion can be dispelled only
by legislation is 'Made hesitatingly but the lack of other alternatives forces such a conclusion. That law is not an exact science
is forcefully evident from the numerous adjudications under the
reviewable orders statute.
Accordingly, there is herewith presented a tentative redraft
of the present statute. No statute is ever perfect, of course, and
perfection is not claimed for this one. But it is believed that the
following sample statute is at least an improvement over the present statute and that it presents a basis of discussion. Comments
to each section follow in footnotes.
"WHEN APPEAL PERMISSIBLE. An appeal may be taken to the
supreme court from the district court or from a county court
of increased jurisdiction when the district court or county
court of increased jurisdiction 112 has entered: 113
1. A judgment or an order for judgment in any action
or special proceedings;

114

2. An order which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken;"'
3. A final order affecting a substantial right in a special
proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after
judgment; "I
4. An order which grants, refuses, continues, modifies, or
dissolves a provisional remedy or injunction, or refuses to
modify or dissolve an injunction, whether such injunction
112. Appeals from county courts of increased jurisdiction are regulated by the same
procedure as district courts. See N.D. Rev. Code §27-0821 (1943).
113. The heading of the Statute, "When Appeal Permissible," is revised for clarity.
thus stating the function of the section more explicitly. The introductory clause specifies
from which courts an appeal may he taken to the supreme court, including the county
courts of increased jurisdiction. This eliminates the need for a cross reference from
section 27-0821, which provides that the rules governing the appeal from the county
courts of increased jurisdiction are the same as those governing appeals from district courts.
114. This subsection does not appear in the present reviewable orders statute and
proposes no significant change. The present rule that orders for judgment are not appealable
appears unnecessarily technical and this section accordingly alters it.
115. This section would modify subsection 1 of the present statute by deleting the
words "affecting a substantial right made in any action." It is believed that the rephrasing
would clarify the law because no independent definition of "substantial right" has ever
been made in terms which would give the phrase any real meaning.
116. This proposed subsection preserves subsection 2 of the present statute unchanged.
The phrase "substantial right" was here retained because the rule of Persons v. Simons
is not applicable to this subsection and consequently the phrase possesses an independent
validity which it lacks in the present subsection 1 of the statute.
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was issued in an action or special proceeding or pursuant
to the provisions of section 35-2204; 517
5. An order which sets aside or dismisses a writ of attachment for irregularity; I1l

6. An order which grants a new trial or sustains a demurrer; 119
7. An order which denies a new trial when such order is
entered after the order for judgment; 120
8. An order which involves the merits of the action or some
part thereof; 121
9. An order made by the district court or county court of
increased jurisdiction is not appealable if made without notice; but an order made by such court, after a hearing upon
notice, ruling upon the correctness of the original order may
be appealed to the supreme court when by the provisions
of this section an appeal might have been taken from the
original order had it been made upon notice." 12
LAVERN C. NEFF

INTERNAL REVENUE -

DEDUCTIONS

AND CREDITS -

DEPLETION

The
underground reserves of oil and gas are wasting assets which
are consumed and exhausted by drilling operations.' Therefore,
when money is invested in the production of oil and gas, it is
invested in the sum total of the oil which is discovered or purchased and the sale of this product reduces the investment. To
make an allowance for the return of such capital, the income
tax law permits the owner of an economic interest in oil and
gas in place to take a depletion allowance when he reports his
ALLOWANCES

WITH RESPECT TO OIL AND

GAS

INTERESTS.

117. This proposed subsection merely rephrases for clarity and shortness subsection 3
of the present statute.
118. Attachment is a provisional remedy and thus is rightfully included within subsection 4 above. However, because the language of this subsection has always been in
the statute it is here placed in a separate subsection merely to simplify the language of
the proposed statute.
119. This retains the rule of the present reviewable orders statute.
120. This modifies the rule of the present statute by making an order denying a new
trial appealable only when entered after the .order for judgment. The change is believed
desirable because in all but the most exceptional cases, the appeal should be from
the order or action of the court which terminates the case, and for the reason that appeals
should be discouraged while the trial is in progress.
121. The language of the present statute has hesitantly been retained here. It would
be more accurate and more logical to say that "An order which effects a substantive right"
is appealable. But the court has not always confined appeals uncer this subsection to
cases where purely substantive rights are involved. This could be solved perhaps by
using the language here suggested and then making orders granting or denying a change
of venue separately appealable. This would be declaratory of the existing case law, for
which a substantial justification exists.
122. This subsection preserves unchanged the language of the present statute but has
jeen rephrased to achieve clarity.
1. See Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U. S. 404, 407 (1940).

